Discovery of the missing ballots and initial reaction
Observers and candidates for Members of Parliament carry out an inspection at a private printing house for election materials. During the loading of the ballots for Kyustendil region (област Кюстендил), they establish that 24,000 ballots are missing.
Eyewitnesses broadcast the event live and describe the situation as a “blatant fraud.” The scandal arises due to a serious discrepancy between the quantities declared in the documents and those actually loaded onto the trucks.
According to an official decision of the Regional Election Commission (Районна избирателна комисия – РИК) in Kyustendil (Кюстендил) dated March 25, the declared print run is 135,000 copies. However, the workers load only 111,000 ballots into the transport trucks.
Documentary inconsistencies and lack of transparency
The representative of the Ministry of Finance (Министерство на финансите), responsible for on-site state control, does not present an official document for the reduced print run. She only shows a mobile phone screen with a list, where the number 111,000 is highlighted in green.
Observers demand an official document with signatures and seals, since this concerns the spending of public funds and the handling of securities. The official refuses further explanations, avoids the cameras, and quickly leaves the scene.
According to institutional claims, the Central Election Commission (Централна избирателна комисия – ЦИК) approved the smaller number a day earlier, on March 24. However, the Regional Election Commission – Kyustendil (РИК – Кюстендил) has not received such a decision in their official emails and remains uninformed.
This complete lack of official communication intensifies suspicions among those present of complicity by the responsible authorities in a vote manipulation scheme.
Comparison with other electoral districts
The issue of missing ballots affects only Kyustendil region (област Кюстендил). The other electoral districts, whose ballots are loaded on the same day, receive their exact declared quantities.
The distribution for the other regions, based on on-site inspections at the printing house, is as follows:
| Electoral district | Declared print run | Loaded ballots | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blagoevgrad (Благоевград) | 270 000 | 270 000 | None |
| Pazardzhik (Пазарджик) | Exact number | Exact number | None |
| Stara Zagora (Стара Загора) | Exact number | Exact number | None |
| Pernik (Перник) | 90 000 | 90 000 | None |
| Kyustendil (Кюстендил) | 135 000 | 111 000 | -24 000 |
Security and control issues
Control over the election materials in the private printing house is described by eyewitnesses as extremely weak and compromised. The ballots on the premises are considered securities, directly linked to the exercise of state sovereignty.
The main security failures in the production process include:
- Free access for various vans and cars entering and leaving the printing house yard without serious inspection of the cargo.
- Lack of specialized gendarmerie teams, despite immediate reports submitted to emergency number 112 by Members of Parliament.
- Arrival of only two police officers, whose sole role is to maintain public order and prevent physical clashes, without investigating the missing ballots.
- Control over outgoing production is carried out by an employee of the private printing house itself, which observers describe as absurd and a clear conflict of interest.
- Security restricts citizens from accessing the internal production areas, limiting them only to the external loading zone.
Concerns about electoral manipulation and historical context
Observers express serious concerns that the missing 24,000 ballots may be used for illegal practices on election day. Kyustendil region (област Кюстендил) has a total of four mandates, and the missing ballots could fully cover three of them.
The situation is directly compared to the widely known Kostinbrod Affair (Костинбродската афера). Participants also recall previous elections where there were serious suspicions of 705,000 missing ballots.
According to claims, these missing quantities are used in organized vote-buying schemes by directly controlling entire sectional election commissions. These suspicions are reinforced by recent arrests in Pleven (Плевен), where police detained vote buyers with lists, cash, and 113 real paper ballots.
Criminal groups aim to create artificial voter turnout by illegally inserting additional ballots into already placed ballot boxes.
Systemic deficiencies and the role of institutions
The Bulgarian National Bank (Българска народна банка – БНБ) hires private subcontractors to print the materials without conducting open and transparent public procurement procedures. This closed model creates ideal conditions for potential abuse.
The Central Election Commission (Централна избирателна комисия – ЦИК) does not provide the requested schedules and exact numbers, despite official written inquiries from Members of Parliament. The institution maintains complete silence and does not respond to submitted reports of alleged crimes.
The state-owned company Information Services (Информационно обслужване) is also subject to serious criticism. According to those present, its analysts deliberately fail to account for the discrepancies and adjust the final figures according to the current political situation.
Additional tension arises from a mass leak of personal data from the Civil Registration System (ЕСГРАОН) just days before the vote, for which official reports have already been submitted. Information boards in the printing house also indicate capacity for printing ID cards and driver’s licenses, raising suspicions of unauthorized mass production of fake documents.
Civic organizations such as Rodolyubtsi za Plovdiv (Родолюбци за Пловдив) and Doyran (Дойран) actively attempt to compensate for the lack of state control. They request official protocols from institutions and plan large-scale inspections of delivered ballots in all municipalities to trace the real movement of election materials after leaving the printing house.
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